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IV

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this appeal under to Utah Code Annotated §
78-2-2(4) pursuant to an Order of the Utah Supreme Court dated August 22, 2005. This
appeal was originally filed with the Utah Supreme Court under Utah Code Annotated § 782-2(3)0).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Issue 1: Whether the district court correctly held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction
to consider the plaintiffs-appellants' ("McFadden'"s) suit because they failed to appeal
the Cache County Council's denial of their preliminary subdivision plat to the Cache
County Board of Adjustment.
Standard of Review: Correctness. See Patterson v. American Fork City, 2003 UT 7, Iflf
8-9, 67 P.3d 466 (applying a correctness standard to evaluate a dismissal based on failure
to exhaust administrative remedies).

Issue 2:

Alternatively, whether the district court correctly held that McFadden's

allegations of estoppel and that the defendant-appellee ("County") interfered with or
discouraged his attempt to appeal the council's decision to the board of adjustment failed
as a matter of law and were inconsistent with McFadden's admissions.
Standard of Review: Correctness. See Culbertson v. Board of County Commissioners,
2001 UT 108, Tf 11, 44 P.3d 642 (applying a correctness standard to a district court's
grant of summary judgment).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below
This case arises from the Cache County Council's denial of McFadden's
preliminary subdivision plat application. After the denial, McFadden filed suit in the
Utah First District Court, petitioning for review of the council's decision, and alleging
that it constituted a takings and violated his due process rights. The County immediately
moved for summary judgment, arguing principally that McFadden failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies because he did not appeal the denial to the county board of
adjustment. The district court granted the County's motion after supplemental briefing
on McFadden's argument that he fell within one of the exceptions to the exhaustion
doctrine. McFadden now appeals that order and judgment.
Facts
With one exception, the facts are not in dispute. On December 7, 2004., the Cache
County Council unanimously denied McFadden's preliminary subdivision plat
application upon a recommendation of denial from the Cache County Planning
Commission.

(R. at 33-34.) The county council later memorialized that denial by

passing Cache County Resolution No. 2004-45, explaining in detail the grounds therefor.
(R. at 43-50.) McFadden did not file an appeal of the council's decision to the county
board of adjustment. (R. at 38.)
McFadden contends that, a few days after the December 7 county council meeting,
he went to the Cache County Administration Building and began filling out an appeals
form he obtained from the zoning office. While filling out the form, the countywide
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planner appeared and told him that he should not be filling out the appeal form, or "words
to the effect that the appeal was not the right procedure." (R. at 97.) McFadden's
attorney alleges that, during the same time period, he was informed by the countywide
planner that "the Board of Adjustments does not review subdivision applications." (R. at
101.) The County denies these allegations, but accepted them as true for the purpose of
its summary judgment motion. (R. at 161 n.2.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Before filing his present action with the district court, McFadden was required to
exhaust his administrative remedies.

Because the county council's denial of his

preliminary plat constituted an administrative decision as specified in Utah Code Ann. §
17-27-703(l)(a), McFadden had to appeal the council's decision to the county's board of
adjustment. He failed to do so, thereby depriving the district court of jurisdiction to
consider its suit.

McFadden's attempt to avoid the application of the exhaustion

requirement by alleging that the countywide planner interfered with his attempt to appeal
the council's decision is belied by his own admissions, which work to prevent McFadden
from meeting the high standards necessary to fall within an exception to the exhaustion
rule.

3

ARGUMENT
I.

McFADDEN WAS REQUIRED TO APPEAL THE COUNTY COUNCIL'S
DENIAL OF HIS PRELIMINARY PLAT TO THE BOARD OF
ADJUSTMENT.
The district court properly held that McFadden was required to appeal the Cache

County Council's denial of his preliminary plat to the county board of adjustment under
Utah Code Annotated § 17-27-703 (2004)1, and that his failure to do so deprived it of
subject matter jurisdiction over his claims because he failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies. (Aplee.'s Addendum at A-l-A-2.)
McFadden implicitly concedes that, if the council's denial of his preliminary plat
constitutes an administrative decision, the district court's ruling that he failed to exhaust
administrative remedies was correct. (Aplts.' Br. at 4-7.) However, McFadden argues
that the term "administrative decision" used in section 17-27-703(l)(a) is ambiguous, and
was added to the statute in 2001 to exclude an undefined class of decisions that are
neither legislative nor administrative, to which the council's denial belongs. (Aplts.' Br.
at 5-7.) McFadden's argument lacks legal basis, as illustrated by his inability to label the
council's decision as anything more definite than "on the extreme 'non-administrative'
end" of "a spectrum of non-legislative subdivision decisions." (Aplts.' Br. at 7.)
Two major flaws afflict McFadden's argument on this point. First, the council's
denial of his preliminary plat was an administrative decision.
1

In Low v. City of

The statute was renumbered and rewritten in 2005, but this matter arose under the prior
version.
4

Monticello, 2002 UT 90, 54 P.3d 1153, the supreme court differentiated between
legislative and administrative ordinances enacted by a municipality, explaining that, "[i]n
general, to be legislative, an ordinance must make a new law; to be administrative, an
ordinance must execute or implement an existing law." Id. at f 24. The council's denial
of McFadden's preliminary plat did not make a new law; rather, it implemented {i.e.,
applied) county ordinances and policies to decide to deny McFadden's application.
This Court's opinion in Bennion v. Sundance Dev. Corp., 897 P.2d 1232 (Utah Ct.
App. 1995), so held: "There is no dispute that the decision [the plaintiff] challenged
below, that is, the approval of a plat, is a decision applying the zoning ordinance." Id. at
1235 (emphasis added). In Bennion, the Court determined that the plaintiff failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies because he did not appeal the Utah County
Commission's approval of a developer's plat to the board of adjustment, see id. at 123334, reasoning that the commission acted "as an administrative officer for purposes of the
ordinance," id. at 1236. Here, too, the county council acted as an administrative officer
when it passed the resolution denying McFadden's preliminary plat. That the denial was
"wholesale" and relied on extensive findings of fact (Aplts.' Br. at 6-7) does not
transform it from a decision implementing or executing existing law to one making new
law, and McFadden offers no authority suggesting otherwise.
Moreover, the council's decision does not fit within any other recognized category
of decision. McFadden concedes it is not legislative. (Aplts.' Br. at 5.) Nor can it be
described as judicial or quasi-judicial. The council was not acting as a court or in any
sort of appellate capacity. See, e.g., Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City, 2000 UT App 31,
5

U 16, 997 P.2d 321 (distinguishing the quasi-judicial reviewing function of a board of
adjustment from the legislative quality of a municipal zoning decision). Finally, the
council's decision also diverges from quasi-legislative or quasi-administrative functions,
as employed in Utah law. See, e.g., Salt Lake Citizens Congress v. Mountain States Tel
& Tel Co., 846 P.2d 1245, 1252 (Utah 1992) (describing administrative rule making as
quasi-legislative); In re Discipline of Harding, 2004 UT 100, ffi[ 6, 21, 104 P.3d 1220
(characterizing the work of the Utah State Bar's Ethics and Disciplinary Committee
screening panel as quasi-administrative).
Although McFadden makes much of it (Aplts.' Br. at 5-7), the changing language
of section 17-27-703 (l)(a) is unrelated to the nature of the council's decision. The statute
merely delineates what decisions must be appealed to the board of adjustment, which
presents the second problem with McFadden's argument: section 17-27-703(l)(a) is not
ambiguous.
McFadden's sole argument that the statute is ambiguous rests on his conclusory
assertion that "[t]he term 'administrative decisions' is susceptible of more than one
meaning in this context, and is therefore ambiguous." (Aplts.' Br, at 5.) McFadden's
assessment ignores controlling rules of statutory construction.

When interpreting a

statute, a court's "'primary objective'" "'is to give effect to the legislature's intent.' The
legislature's intent is manifested by the language it employed." Smith v. Price Dev. Co.,
2005 UT 87, Tf 16, 125 P.3d 945 (quoting Gohler v. Wood, 919 P.2d 561, 562 (Utah
1996)) (citation omitted). Consequently, a court "may turn to secondary principles of
statutory construction or look to a provision's legislative history only if [it] fmd[s] the
6

provision ambiguous." Id. That threshold determination is made by reference "'to the
plain language of the statute.'" Peeples v. Utah, 2004 UT App 328, If 8,100 P.3d 254
(quoting In re Estate of Flake, 2003 UT 17, ^ 25, 71 P.3d 589). In looking to the statute's
plain language, the court "'assume[s] that each term in the statute was used advisedly;
thus the statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused
or inoperable.'" Id. (quoting Flake, 2003 UT 17, ^f 25) (citation omitted). The court
"give[s] the words their usual and accepted meaning" when making that literal reading.
State v. Madsen, 2002 UT App 345, f 6, 57 P.3d 1134.
Contrary to McFadden's apparent reasoning, '"[a] statute is not ambiguous merely
because the parties disagree about its meaning.' Rather, '[a] statute is ambiguous [only]
if it can be understood by reasonably well-informed persons to have different
meanings.'" Peeples, 2004 UT App 328, H 8 n.3 (quoting State v. Season, 2000 UT App
109, TJ19, 2 P.3d 459) (citations omitted) (all alterations but first in original).
Here, the term "administrative decisions" as used in section 17-27-703, when read
literally, giving the words their usual and accepted meaning, is unambiguous. Such a
reading is not unreasonably confused, but results in a practical construction consistent
with prior decisions like Bennion. Rather, it is McFadden's interpretation, based upon
the unsupported assumption that the drafters, by using the phrase "administrative
decisions," meant all nonlegislative decisions, that evokes confusion. "Administrative
decisions" is instead an unambiguous term designating a class of decisions, as opposed to
judicial or legislative decisions, over which the board of adjustment has jurisdiction to
hear appeals. There exists no indication that the legislature intended anything more than
7

to clarify the statute. Indeed, McFadden5 s construction violates the accepted presumption
"'that the expression of one should be interpreted as the exclusion of another.5"5 Martinez
v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2005 UT App 308, ^ 8, 117 P.3d 1074 (quoting Piddle v.
Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT 110, \ 14, 993 P.2d 875). Rather than interpreting
"administrative decision55 as limited to administrative decisions, McFadden asks this
Court to construe the phrase as including all nonlegislative decisions. Such reasoning
impermissibly interprets section 17-27-703 5s unambiguous language as contradicting its
plain meaning. See State v. Hodges, 2002 UT 117, t 14, 63 P.3d 66 ("However, 'a
statute's unambiguous language may not be interpreted to contradict its plain meaning.555
(quoting State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, If 25, 4 P.3d 795 (citation omitted))).
The district court correctly held that McFadden was required to appeal the
council5s denial of his preliminary plat to the county board of adjustment, and that,
having failed to do so, it lacked jurisdiction to consider his challenge.
II.

McFADDEN WAS NOT EXCUSED
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY.

FROM

EXHAUSTING

HIS

McFadden does not dispute that Utah Code Annotated § 17-27-1001(1) (2004)2
required him to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to challenging the council's
decision in district court. Nor does McFadden dispute that "[wjhere the legislature has
imposed a specific exhaustion requirement such as that contained in section 10-9-1001
[(section 17-27-100l5s then-sibling provision for municipalities)], [Utah courts] will

2

As with section 17-27-703, this section was also rewritten and renumbered in 2005.
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enforce it strictly." Patterson, 2003 UT 7, ^ 17.3
Plaintiffs may be excused from exhausting their administrative remedies only if
failing to do so would be unconscionable or futile.
Exceptions to [the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies] exist
in unusual circumstances where [(1)] it appears that there is a likelihood
that some oppression or injustice is occurring such that it would be
unconscionable not to review the alleged grievance or [(2)] where it
appears that exhaustion would serve no useful purpose.
State Tax Comm'n v. Iverson, 782 P.2d 519, 524 (Utah 1989) (footnotes omitted)).
Because McFadden does not argue that appealing the council's decision to the board of
adjustment would have been futile, he relies exclusively on the argument that requiring
him to have done so would be unconscionable. (Aplts.' Br. at 8-11.) That argument
fails.
Iverson cited Ziegler v. Miliken, 583 P.2d 1175 (Utah 1978), as support for the
unconscionability standard. See Iverson, 782 P.2d at 524 n.4. Ziegler involved a habeas
corpus petition, explaining that such a petition would not be granted unless the prisoner
demonstrated, inter alia, that he had exhausted his administrative remedies. The court
noted an exception (adopted in the civil context in Iverson) "only in an unusual exigency
where it appears that there is a likelihood that some such oppression or injustice is
occurring that it would be unconscionable not to examine into the alleged grievance."

3

McFadden's suggestion that exhaustion would be excused upon showing a compelling
reason (Aplts.' Br. at 8) misreads Patterson, which stated simply that the plaintiffs there
had offered no compelling argument against strictly enforcing the exhaustion
requirement. See Patterson, 2003 UT 7, ^ 17. Regardless, as shown infra, McFadden
offers no compelling reason why he should have been excused from this requirement.

9

Ziegler, 583 P.2d at 1176 (footnote omitted). The supreme court held that the prisoner's
placement in isolated confinement did not warrant bypassing administrative review. See
id. In contract disputes, Utah courts have analogized unconscionability to a shocks-theconscience standard. See, e.g., Morris v. Sykes, 624 P.2d 681, 683 & 684 (Utah 1981)
(affirming a district court's holding a contract's forfeiture provision unconscionable
because it shocked the court's conscience).
There exists no evidence here that, because McFadden has been prevented from
leapfrogging the board of adjustment to seek direct review of the council's administrative
decision in district court, he has suffered some oppression or injustice that shocks the
conscience. The allegations of McFadden's and his attorney's affidavits upon which he
relies (Aplts.' Br. at 9) compel no such conclusion. In fact, as the district court found, the
admissions contained in those same affidavits and McFadden's summary judgment
memoranda contradict his argument that the County engaged in unconscionable conduct
excusing his obligation to strictly comply with the exhaustion requirement. (Aplee.'s
Addendum at A-2.)
McFadden's argument entirely ignores the district court's findings that it was
undisputed that (1) he was "represented by counsel at all relevant time periods"; (2) he
"possessed Cache County Ordinance § 17.02.020(B) that specified the powers of the
County's board of adjustment"; (3) he was "aware of the provision of Utah Code Ann. §
17-27-703 that specified the powers of a board of adjustment under state law"; (4) he
"did not rely on legal advice provided by the County"; and (5) he "never submitted a
signed board of adjustment appeal that was rejected by the County."
10

(Aplee.'s

Addendum at A-2.) Because it is undisputed that McFadden was represented by counsel
(R. at 99-102) and in possession, and therefore implicitly aware of, the controlling
ordinance and statute (R. at 100-01), he was obligated to at least attempt to file an appeal,
regardless the countywide planner's alleged provision of contrary information (Aplts.'
Br. at 9). Because McFadden did not at least attempt to submit the appeal form he was
given (Aplts.' Br. at 9), he cannot assert that the County either refused to accept it or
rejected it. Without actually securing a rejection of his appeal, particularly when the
county ordinance and state law explicitly required it, McFadden cannot claim he should
be excused from strictly complying with the statutory requirement of exhausting his
administrative remedies.
In fact, McFadden's admission that he was "not claiming that Cache County
provided legal advice on which [he] relied in not filing an appeal" (R. at 122) should by
itself dispose of his argument. Since he did not rely on the countywide planner's alleged
statements (explaining the proper procedure for an appeal constitutes legal advice), he
cannot claim unconscionable oppression or injustice.
The County finds analogous support under another statutory provision requiring
strict compliance: the notice of claim provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act. See, e.g., Greene v. Utah Transit Auth., 2001 UT 109, f 14, 37 P.3d 1156 ("Where,
as here, the statute is clear, readily available, and easily accessible by counsel, there is no
reason to require anything less than strict compliance."). In Greene, the plaintiff alleged
that a Utah Transit Authority claims adjuster instructed her attorney to send him the
required notice of claim, although he knew he was not the proper individual to whom the
11

notice should be delivered. Id. at *|ffl 5-7. Affirming the district court's dismissal of the
plaintiffs complaint for failing to deliver the notice to the correct individual, the supreme
court held that, "[e]ven assuming [the claims adjuster] made the statements [the plaintiff]
alleges he made, his delivery instructions cannot override the requirements set by the
legislature." Id. at ^f 17 (footnote omitted). Likewise, even assuming the countywide
planner made the statements McFadden and McFadden's counsel claim he did, his advice
did not override the requirement for McFadden to appeal the county council's denial to
the board of adjustment.
McFadden appears to assert that the County's submission of the countywide
planner's affidavit created a genuine issue of material fact. (Aplts.' Br. at 10.) In doing
so, McFadden fails to mention that the County explained at the time it submitted the
affidavit that it did so simply to note that the countywide planner denied making the
comments, and "acknowledge[d] that McFadden's allegations must be accepted as true in
th[e] summary judgment context, and accordingly limit[ed] its argument." (R. at 161.)
Moreover, the district court did not consider the countywide planner's affidavit in its
judgment. (Aplee.'s Addendum at A-l-A-3.)
To the extent McFadden attempts to make an estoppel argument, his attempt fails.

4

McFadden's attempt to read the countywide planner's affidavit as actually supportive of
his account of the conversations by using partial quotes taken out of context stretches his
testimony beyond reason. According to the countywide planner, he told McFadden he
"had to" wait until the county council made a decision on his preliminary plat before he
could file an appeal to the board of adjustment, and told McFadden's counsel, after the
planning commission's recommendation, that "the Board of Adjustment does not review
'subdivision applications ....'" (R. at 155-56 (second emphasis added).)
12

"Utah recognizes the general rule that estoppel may not be asserted against a
governmental entity." Weese v. Davis County Comm'n, 834 P.2d 1, 4-5 (Utah 1992)
(footnote omitted). However, "in unusual circumstances, when it is plainly apparent that
its application would result in injustice, and there would be no substantial adverse effect
on public policy," plaintiffs may assert estoppel.

Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co.

("Sutro"), 646 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 1982). "This exception applies, however, only if'the
facts may be found with such certainty, and the injustice suffered is of sufficient gravity,
to invoke the exception.'" Anderson v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 839 P.2d 822, 827 (Utah
1992) (quoting Sutro, 646 P.2d at 720). Thus, "[t]he exception requires 'a high standard
of proof and has only applied in cases involving 'very specific written representations by
authorized government entities.'" Thimmes v. Utah State Univ., 2001 UT App 93, ^ 8, 22
P.3d 257 (quoting Anderson, 839 P.2d at 827). Those representations were "explicit,"
"very clear," and "well-substantiated." Anderson, 839 P.2d at 828. "Moreover, as a
prerequisite to a finding of injustice, the party asserting estoppel must show that it acted
with 'reasonable prudence and diligence' in relying on the [governmental entity's]
representations." Consolidation Coal Co. v. Div. of State Lands and Forestry, 886 P.2d
514, 522 (Utah 1994) (quoting Morgan v. Bd. of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah
1976)).
As previously discussed, McFadden denies he relied on the countywide planner's
information. Accordingly, he cannot successfully assert estoppel. Nor does McFadden
present any evidence of specific written representations by authorized entities. The
countywide planner was not authorized to override county ordinances or state law.
13

Moreover, McFadden's assignment of the date of his conversation with the countywide
planner as "a few days after December 7, 200[4]" (Aplts.' Br. at 9) places the
conversation prior to the date he claims the council's decision became final: December
14 (R. at 38).

These circumstances do not present the unusual situation when an

exception to the general rule precluding asserting estoppel against governmental entities
applies.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the district court's judgment.
DATED this 1st day of March, 2006.
CACHE COUNTY ATTORNEY
N. George Daines

CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.

BartonH. KunzH
Craig V. Wentz

I

Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee Cache County
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APPELLEE'S ADDENDUM

Craig V.Wentz, #3681
Bart H.Kunz II, #8827
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801)355-3431
Attorneys for Cache County
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT A. McFADDEN; and RAMACFOOTHILLS, LLC,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 050100058

CACHE COUNTY CORPORATION; and
JOHN DOES and JANE DOES 1-10,

Judge Stanton M. Taylor

Defendants.
Defendant Cache County's Motion for Summary Judgment came on regularly for hearing
before the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor on June 20, 2005, Craig V. Wentz appearing for
Defendant Cache County, Chris and David Daines appearing for Plaintiffs. Upon reviewing the
Motion and Memoranda, and hearing the argument of counsel, the Court enters the following
Judgment pursuant to Rule 58A(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
L

Plaintiffs' Petition for Review and Inverse Condemnation Claims are dismissed

with prejudice.
2.

Plaintiffs failed to appeal the Cache County Council's December 7, 2004 denial of

their preliminary plat to the Cache County Board of Adjustment. Consequently, this Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-703 gave the Cache County Board of

Adjustment authority to "hear and decide appeals from administrative decisions applying a
zoning or subdivision ordinance, including appeals from ... administrative decisions related to
subdivision plats; ...." Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-703(l)(a)(ii). Plaintiffs' contention that the
County Council's decision to deny their preliminary plat application was not an "administrative
decision" within the meaning of § 17-27-703 is without merit.
3.

Administrative remedies must be exhausted before pursuing state constitutional

claims. See Patterson v. American Fork City, 67 P.3d 466, 472 (Utah 2003). Accordingly,
Plaintiffs' inverse condemnation claims must also be dismissed.
4.

Plaintiffs' estoppel claims and their contention that defendant interfered with or

discouraged their attempt to appeal to the Board of Adjustment fail as a matter of law and are
inconsistent with admissions contained in Plaintiffs' opposition memoranda and affidavits. For
example, Plaintiffs admit that they: (a) were represented by counsel at all relevant time periods;
(b) possessed Cache County Ordinance § 17.02.020(B) that specified the powers of the County's
board of adjustment; (c) were aware of the provision of Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-703 that
specified the powers of a board of adjustment under state law; (d) did not rely on legal advice
provided by the County, and (e) never submitted a signed board of adjustment appeal that was
rejected by the County.
5.

Accordingly, summary judgment is hereby entered in favor of Defendant Cache

County and against Plaintiffs Robert A. McFadden and RAMAC-FOOTHILLS, LLC.

2

DATED this

12

day of July, 2005.
BY THE COURT:
* 'y Y*

^

~

The Honorable StaMoi^M. Taylor
First Judicial District Judge Sitting
for Judge Clinton S. Judkins
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CLERK OF COURT'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ,-^Y7 day of July, 2005, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Order was served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Brian G. Cannell
HILLYARD ANDERSON
175E100N
Logan UT 84321
Fax: 435/753-8895
Chris Daines
CHRISTOPHER DAINES, P.C.
135 Main, Ste. 108
Logan UT 84321
Fax: 435/753-1950
Craig V. Wentz
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
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CACHE COUNTY, UTAH

ZONING ORDINANCE
TITLE 17

Ordinance 2004-10

Approved by County Council 08/10/2004
Publication Date
Effective Date 08/26/2004
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Ordinance 2004-10

Effective Date - 08/26/04

CHAPTER 17.02
ADMINISTRATION
17.02.010
17.02.020
17.02.030
17.02.040
17.02.050
17.02.060
17.02.070
17.02.080
17.02.090

Planning Commission
Board of Adjustment
Zoning Administrator
Building Official
Notice of Meetings
Amendments to the Zoning Ordinance
Adoption and Amendment of the Countywide Comprehensive Plan
Rules for Interpretation of Zoning District and Overlay Map Boundaries
Interpretation of Authorized Permitted or Conditional Uses

1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

17.02.010 Planning Commission
A. Creation - There is hereby created and established the Cache County Planning Commission
and the Benson Planning Commission.
B. Powers and Duties - The Planning Commission shall have the power and duties enumerated
at Section 17-27-204 UCA 1953.
C. Planning Commission Appointment, Membership, Removal, Terms, and Procedures.
1. The Planning Commission shall be composed of seven (7) members.
2. Members of the Planning Commission shall be appointed by the County Council upon a
recommendation of the Cache County Executive.
3. The County Council, upon a recommendation of the Cache County Executive, may
remove a member of the Planning Commission with or without cause.
4. All members shall serve a term of three (3) years. Terms of membership shall be such that
the term of two (2) members shall expire each year except the term of three (3) members
shall expire every third year.
5. At the first meeting of each calendar year, the members of the Planning Commission shall
elect one of their members as chair.
6. The Planning Commission shall adopt additional policies and procedures for the conduct
of its meetings, the processing of applications, and for other purposes considered
necessary for the functioning of the Planning Commission. These policies and procedures
will be approved by the County Council.
7. It shall be the policy of the Planning Commission to provide for and entertain public
input, within reason, when considering any proposal before them.
17.02.020 Board of Adjustment
A. Creation: There is established a "Cache County Board of Adjustment," hereinafter, the BOA.
The Board of Adjustment shall consist of five members ans whatever alternate members that
the chief executive officer considers appropriate.
B. Powers and Duties: The BOA shall have the powers and duties set forth in Section 17-27703.
C. Appointment, Terms and Alternates: The members of the BOA shall be appointed in
accordance with Section 17-27-701 UCA 1953. The term of each member shall be five years,
with one term expiring each year. Alternate members may serve on the BOA in which case
Cache County Zoning Ordinance - Administration
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Chapter 17.02 - Page 1

Westlaw
UT ST § 17-27-703

Page 1

U.C.A. 1953 § 17-27-703

WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 17. COUNTIES
CHAPTER 27. COUNTY LAND USE DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT ACT
PART 7. BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
-•§ 17-27-703. Powers and duties
(1) The board of adjustment shall hear and decide:

(a) appeals from administrative decisions
ordinance, including appeals from:

applying

a

zoning

or

subdivision

(i) building permit denials based upon a failure to comply with a zoning or
subdivision ordinance; and
(ii) administrative decisions related to subdivision plats;
(b) special exceptions to the terms of the zoning ordinance;
(c) variances from the terms of the zoning ordinance; and

(d) appeals from a decision approving or denying a conditional use permit, unless
the county legislative body has by ordinance designated itself or another body to
hear and decide those appeals.
(2) The board of adjustments may make determinations regarding the existence,
expansion, or modification of nonconforming uses if that authority is delegated to
them by the legislative body.
(3) If authorized by the legislative body, the board of adjustment may interpret
the zoning maps and pass upon disputed questions of lot lines, district boundary
lines, or similar questions as they arise in the administration of the zoning
regulations.

® 2 004 Thomson/West
END OF DOCUMENT

2 006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

CACHE COUNTY COUNCIL MEETING
December 07, 2004
The Cache County Council convened in a regular session on December 07, 2004, in the Cache
County Council Chamber at 179 North Main, Logan, Utah.
ATTENDANCE:
Chairman:
Vice Chairman:
Council Members:
County Executive:
County Clerk:

H. Craig Petersen
John Hansen
Brian Chambers, Paul Cook, Darrel Gibbons, Kathy Robison, Cory
Yeates.
M. Lynn Lemon
Jill N. Zollinger

The following individuals were also in attendance: Ashley Albrecht, Megan Barker, Charlie Batten,
Lloyd Berentzen, Brian G. Cannell, Wayne Cardon, Cpt. Kim Cheshire, LaMar Clements, Mae Coover,
Merv Coover, Morley Cox, David Craw, Attorney George Daines, Lynne Goodhart, Jim Goodwin, Jack
Greene, Nolan Gunnell, Eric Hansen, Dennis C. Jensen, Jeff Keller, Grant Koford, Mike Larson, Randy
Martin, Chief Mark Meaker, Sheriff Lynn Nelson, Glen Oliverson, Pat Parker, Dr. Ed Redd, Scott Rodgers,
Brett Roper, Steve Russell, Jim Smith, Zane A. Stephens, Auditor Tamra Stones, Denise Strong, Mark
Teuscher, Tom Walbridge, Mike Weibel, Angela Williams, Timothy Wolters Media: Rashae Ophus
(Herald Journal), Jennie Christensen (KVNU).

CALL TO ORDER
Chairman Petersen called the meeting to order at 5:00 p.m.
OPENING REMARKS
The opening remarks were given by Darrel Gibbons.
PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE
Chairman Petersen lead those present in the Pledge of Allegiance.
REVIEW AND APPROVAL OF AGENDA
The agenda was approved as written.
REVIEW AND APPROVAL OF MINUTES
The minutes of the November 23, 2004, Council meeting were approved as corrected.

Cache County Council
12-07-04
Force's plan and Petersen said he would like a Public Hearing on this topic. Petersen
said a resolution addressing the Task Force's recommendations will be on the agenda
at a future Cache County Council Meeting.
PUBLIC HEARING: 2005/BUDGET/CERTIFIED TAX RATE (TO BE DETERMINED AT
HEARING) - Lemon indicated the information about the tax increase of 14.7% had been
published as required. Lemon said the majority of the increase, about 70%, is for the countywide ambulance system.
Chairman Petersen opened the Public Hearing and invited public comment.
The following individuals spoke in opposition to the tax increase:
Dennis Jensen
Morley Cox
Mike Larson
Steven Russell
Tim Wolters, as a new resident in Cache County, questioned why there was a 70% increase.
Lemon explained that the majority of the increase is to fund the county-wide ambulance service.
Brett Roper observed that in 2003 Cache County residents paid less than Salt Lake and Weber
Counties and slightly more than Davis, Utah and Box Elder.
Sheriff Lynn Nelson and Auditor Tamra Stones each asked the Council to reconsider their
requests for additional personnel.
Gibbons said when citizens look at their property tax statements and note that a big portion of
their tax increases are for school districts.
ACTION: Motion by Council member Yeates to close the Public Hearing. Hansen
seconded the motion. The vote was unanimous, 7-0.
PENDING ACTION
Q

Preliminary Plat Approval - Foothill Subdivision - Chairman Petersen said significant
public comment had been received on this issue at the last Council meeting arid invited
Attorney Brian Cannell, representing Rob McFadden (RAMAC-Foothills LLC), to make
a brief statement. Cannell cited a letter from him to the Council written at the Council's
request for a "legal opinion" on the Foothill Subdivision. Canned contends the Council
cannot deny McFadden's plat as McFadden has complied with all of the requirements
for a subdivision in the county. Gibbons said Mr. McFadden was aware of the
disapproval of the planning commission from the beginning. Hansen said he has had
many calls from residents in the area who oppose this subdivision. Chambers said
McFadden understood the risk involved when he invested in the property. Daines said
McFadden has tried to sidestep the full process by asking that the preliminary plat
approval be combined with the final plat approval. Clements said McFadden was told
from the very first that this was not considered an appropriate development for the
location. Gibbons said for the eighteen years he has served the county, the philosophy
of the county has always been to not approve major subdivisions in isolated areas; that
major developments should be near existing municipalities. Hansen and Lemon said
the access road does not meet county requirements and would be unsafe.
(Attachment 5)

Cache County Council
12-07-04
ACTION: Motion by Council member Gibbons to accept the recommendation of the
Planning Commission and deny the preliminary plat approval for the Foothill Subdivision
based on these findings of fact:
1. The density of the subdivision is too extreme for the agricultural zone.
2. The subdivision is not in harmony with the philosophy of the Comprehensive
Plan for the county.
3. This is an urban subdivision requiring municipal services.
4. The requirement for a culinary water system was not met by the applicant.
(The water system provided by the applicant should not be an issue because
other requirements were not met.)
5. Access is inadequate and property is not available to make the access
adequate.
Cook seconded the motion. The vote was unanimous, 7-0.
Petersen asked the County Attorney's office to prepare a detailed findings of fact based on the
motion that was passed. Daines said he would prepare those findings by the December 14,
2004, Council meeting and would send a copy to Attorney Canned.
•

Discussion - Proposed 2005 Budget - Petersen asked Lemon what his
recommendation was in reference to the Council's substituting a Financial Officer under
the Executive instead of a financial manager in the Sheriffs Department and a clerical
position added in the Auditor's Office. Lemon said the present budget includes a
financial individual with a salary of $55,000 plus benefits and $10,000 for a clerical
position in the Auditor's office. The consensus of the Council was to approve a
Financial Officer under the Executive.

ACTION: Motion by Council member Gibbons to approve hiring a Financial Officer under
the Executive and that Sheriff Nelson and Auditor Stones be involved in writing the job
description for this position and be members of the search committee. Robison
seconded the motion. The motion passed, 6 aye - Chambers, Gibbons, Hansen,
Petersen, Cook & Robison, 1 abstained - Yeates.

INITIAL PROPOSAL FOR CONSIDERATION OF ACTION
Resolution No. 2004-42 - Adoption of 2005 Budget - NO ACTION TAKEN - Auditor
Stones said the Children's Justice Center has submitted some last-minute changes to
the budget and asked that this Resolution be moved to the December 14, 2004, Council
meeting agenda.
Ordinance No. 2004-19 - Setting 2005 Salaries for Certain Elected Officials
(Attachment 6)
ACTION: Motion by Council member Gibbons to waive the rules and adopt Ordinance
No. 2004-19 - Setting 2005 Salaries for Certain Elected Officials. Yeates seconded the
motion. The vote was unanimous, 7-0.

-ZLI

Cache County Council
12-07-04
COUNCIL MEMBER REPORTS
Chambers told the Council members they were invited to the Eccles Ice Center the evening of
January 15, 2005, to a reception and ice hockey game.
Robison passed around an artist's concept of the proposed downtown conference center.
ADJOURNMENT
The Council meeting adjourned at 8:00 p.m.

ATTEST: Jill N. Z o t f i r t a e r 7 T

APPROVAL: H. Craig Petersen

CACHE COUNTY
RESOLUTION NO. 2 0 0 4 - ^
A RESOLUTION ADOPTING FINDINGS TO BE APPENDED TO THE
MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL MEETING OF DECEMBER 7TH5 2004,
DENYING APPROVAL OF THE PRELIMINARY PLAT OF THE
FOOTHILLS MAJOR SUBDIVISION.
Whereas, the County Council, denied approval of the Preliminary Plat of the
Foothills Major Subdivision after having received a recommendation for denial from
the Planning Commission; and,
Whereas, the Council directed the County Attorney to draft appropriate
Fmdings for that denial to be presented, discussed and approved in its next meeting on
December 14th
NOW THEREFORE, the Cache County Council hereby makes and approves
the following Findings as the basis for its Resolution accepting and affirming the
recommendation of the Cache County Planning Commission to deny the request of the
Owner, RAMAC-Foothills LLC for preliminary plat approval of the Foothills Major
Subdivision; to wit:
1.

Municipal Services: The Council finds that the proposed subdivision would
require extensive ongoing municipal type sendees in the unincorporated area.
The proposal of the developer is that all internal roads, fire system including
water lines and reservoir, sidewalks, gutters, common areas, etc., would be
owned and forever maintained by a private homeowner's association. The
proposed utilization of a homeowners association to provide these municipal
services is unsatisfactory. The experience of the County is that such
independent private associations are ineffective in providing such municipal
services because there is a lack of equipment, experience, capital, funding and
legal capacity to provide such services. The experience of Cache County and
other governmental entities is that such associations inevitably are unable to
provide such services and eventually the responsible governmental agencies are
required to provide such services. Further, the experience and judgment of the
Council is that the difficulty of such associations increases geometrically with
the number of lots and facilities to be jointly maintained. This proposed 19 lot
subdivision is unacceptable for this reason alone.

£xHi6(T
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Community Water System: The Planning Commission indicated that were the
subdivision to be approved, that a private culinary water system should be
required. The owner refuses to comply with this proposed requirement
suggesting he cannot be legally required to develop such a system as it will cost
him more money. The Council finds that the decision of the Planning
Commission to propose this as a requirement is justified and confirms that it
would be a requirement were this subdivision to be otherwise approved. The
proposal of the owner is that the 19 lots would each develop a separate
pressurized culinary water system complete with a new well, pump, storage,
etc. The standard for private culinaiy water systems is that when this number of
homes are involved that their culinary water should meet certain tests and
standards and that the water system have certain capacities and reserves. This
owner would avoid all of these requirements by the creation of these 19
separate water systems. However, in a practical way, the reasons for the
standards, testing, controls, purification systems, etc., are good water policy. In
addition, if the cost of drilling, operating and maintaining these separate water
systems were considered together, any cost savings is illusory. There is no
evidence that the collective cost and/or maintenance of a private culinary water
system is more expensive. The owner simply refuses to consider such a
requirement on the basis that it shifts costs from the home owner to the
developer. Given the benefits of a private culinary water system in temis of
safety, quality of operation, etc., this requirement is sustained. Furthermore it is
noted that the State Water Engineer's Office and the Bear River Health
Department both independently recommended a culinary water system be used
were this subdivision to be approved. The Council finds that the Planning
Commission appropriately considered and followed such expert
recommendations. The Council finds that legally the Planning Commission can
consider and reasonably recommend this requirement. Furthermore, it is the
judgment of the Council that this particular major subdivision, having 19 lots in
a relatively dense, urban type subdivision, should have the preferred alternative
of a culinary water system. Given the owner's refusal, this is a separate basis
for denial.
Roads: The Planning Commission made findings that the road access was
inadequate for the subdivision proposed. Experience has indicated that each
dwelling results in an average of seven round trips per day or 14 trips per
dwelling. This 19 lot subdivision would increase traffic flows by 266 trips per
day. The County has already placed a moratorium on development on the west
side of the Highway 23 servicing this area because of traffic and safety
concerns. In addition the immediate access of this subdivision to Highway 23 is
on a narrow third priority county road with a gravel driving surface. This road
has inadequate services (maintenance and snow removal) for this development.

The County Council finds that this proposed subdivision has inadequate access.
In addition as to the internal roads, the Council finds that the proposed
ownership and maintenance of the internal roads by a homeowner's association
is bad policy, unworkable and ill advised. The County's experience is that such
arrangements do not work.
Non-Compliance with the Agricultural Zone: The Council finds that this
subdivision should not be permitted in the Agricultural Zone because it does
not meet the purposes of that Zone. See, Section 17.09.010, Cache County
Code. The Council finds that this subdivision with its density and arrangement
of lots and streets would not "promote and protect the opportunities for a broad
range of agricultural uses and activities." This is an urban subdivision that
appropriately belongs within the urban communities of Cache Valley. The
Council also finds that this subdivision would impinge upon and burden
surrounding property owners who are engaged in agricultural pursuits. It would
result in immediate and long term conflicts with present and future agricultural
uses. Further, this subdivision has nothing to do with or any relation to
agriculture, the stated purpose of this Zone. The Council notes that the
developer has not suggested that this proposed subdivision would benefit the
agricultural uses this zone is designed to protect and foster. In that regard, the
Council would also note the uniform opposition of surrounding adjacent
agricultural users expressed in public meetings of the Planning Commission
and Council. The Council finds that this subdivision as proposed, would be
harmful and result in ongoing and irremediable conflict with adjacent
agricultural uses. It is the experience of the Council that future homeowners
will not long accept normal agricultural practices adjacent to their homes and
lots in an urban style subdivision, notwithstanding present assurances from the
developer otherwise.
Non-Compliance with the Comprehensive Plan: Cache County adopted its
Comprehensive Plan on January 27, 1998, designating the same as "advisory
guide for land use decisions." The Planning Commission and County Council
are further ordered to use it as a "decision-making tool by which all requests
and proposals before the Planning Commission and County Council are
measured." Comprehensive Plan, at page 3. The Zoning Ordinance as of a part
of its Agricultural Zone expressly implements the policies of that Plan for the
purpose of protecting agricultural lands and promoting agriculture. Section
17.09.10 B, Cache County Code. The County Comprehensive Plan and its Land
Use Ordinances (Zoning Ordinance and Subdivision Ordinance) are designed
to be "interwoven and consistent" in their interpretation and requirements. Plan
at page 6. The policies and advisory statements of the Countywide
Comprehensive Plan warrant denial of this preliminary plat; to wit:

Residential Development Requires Improved Roadways. Plan at page
13. Within that section, the Planning Commission and Council are
advised to limit development within close proximity of existing
municipalities and match road networks with degree of development.
Difficulties of Urban Sprawl and Provision of Urban Municipal Services
to Unincorporated Areas of the County. Plan at page 23.
Need for Protection of Agricultural Lands. Plan at pages 55-63.
Need to Limit Urban Developments in Unincorporated County. Plan at
page 70. In this regard the Comprehensive Plan is that "development
will be limited based on the ability of the County to provide services."
Id. In this regard it is noted that the alternative of a homeowner's
association to provide for those services is not even considered an
alternative. The Plan specifically notes that the costs of providing such
municipal services "cannot... be totally placed upon the new
development." Id. In contravention of the Comprehensive Plan, the
owner suggests exactly that. This is found to be impractical and
unworkable. The Plan as a matter of policy states that municipalities
should be the primary providers of such urban type services.
The Policy of Cache County is that Urban Services Shall Be Provided by
the Existing Municipalities Not the County. Plan at page 106An this
regard it is noted that the Plan points out that if the County allows urban
development to occur in the unincorporated areas it will eventually be
required to provide such urban services. Id. It is further noted that there
are significant cost savings realized with economies of scale in using
municipalities as the provider of such services. Id. Conversely,
providing such services to pockets of urbanized development in the
unincorporated areas, is cost prohibitive.
The subdivision as proposed is contrary to all of the relevant goals of the
Comprehensive Plan for Cache County; to wit:
i.

Agriculture Goal 1: Maintain agricultural and open space. Plan at
page 109.

ii.

Agriculture Goal 2: Preserve agriculture and agricultural industry
in harmony with the agricultural use of the land. Plan at page
109.

6.

7.

iii.

Residential Housing Development Goal 1: Limit urban sprawl
and growth in non-urban areas-protect the agriculture and open
space. Plan at page 111.

iv.

Residential Housing Development Goal 2: Preserve and protect
the rural atmosphere of non-urban areas. Plan at page 111.

v.

Residential Housing Development Goal 3: Provide adequate level
of services. Plan at page 112.

vi.

Residential Housing Development Goal 4: Protect private
property rights and discourage land speculation. Plan at page
112. This goal specifically notes that the rights of adjacent
owners should also be considered.

vii.

Quality of Life Goal 1: Maintain and protect open spaces. Plan at
page 119.

viii.

Transportation Goal 2: Limit urban sprawl. Plan at page 121.

Contravenes Planning District #6 Recommendations: The Cache County
Comprehensive Plan includes specific recommendations as to what types of
development should occur within each District or area of the County. The
proposed development falls within Planning District #6. See Plan at page 6.
The goals and policies of the Plan as to this District #6 are that "lot sizes
should be larger (5 to 10 acres)" and that "major subdivisions should be located
in the existing communities." Plan at page 137. Further, the Plan is that
development should (1) be limited to the communities; (2) not "leap frog into
agricultural areas;" and, (3)"protect agricultural land uses." Planning District
#6 is burdened with "safety problems along Highway 23 and development
[there] should be limited." Plan at page 146. This subdivision would add all of
its new traffic [averaging one vehicle every 4 minutes] directly onto Highway
23, turning right or left, to or from, an inadequate gravel road. It includes no
provisions for improvements of these existing roads. The County Council
reaffirms the Plan's recommendations as to this District #6 and the basis for
them. The Council specifically finds that approval of this subdivision would
contravene long standing county policy as to Planning District #6.
Urbanizes Prime Agricultural Land: The County Council finds that the
agricultural land proposed for this subdivision is designated and rated "prime
agricultural land." The Council reconfirms pursuant to its stated policies as
expressed in its Comprehensive Plan and Land Use Ordinances, that it will
»\-n

endeavor and intends to protect "prime agricultural land" from such urban
development. This constitutes an additional separate finding on which the
denial of this preliminary plat is based.
Reliance Claims: The owner and his legal counsel assert a legal claim that
approval must be given because the owner has justifiably relied on directions or
comments of the Planning Commission, individual commissioners, its staff, etc.
The Council finds that such claims are not well founded. The Planning
Commission's role is limited to that of developing a recommendation to the
Council as to whether a preliminary plat should be approved. The claim that the
County is somehow bound by these negotiations and/or discussions with the
Commission (or planning staff), is in error. The Council rejects all such claims
of reliance; it has reserved to itself the sole power to approve such subdivisions
and the conditions therefore. Section 17-27-805 U.C.A. 1953; Cache County
Subdivision Ordinance, Title 16, Cache County Code. As a further basis for its
rejection of the owner's claims, the Council provides these additional findings
as to reliance:
a.

First, the Council reaffirms that the Planning Commission can only
make decisions as a body; the comments or suggestions of individual
commissioners, while instructive, do not represent the decisions of that
body. Apparently, the individual commissioners, over the course of
several meetings, expressed a variety of technical concerns and asked
that those concerns be addressed. However, the only decision made by
the Planning Commission, is the one Mr. McFadden now appeals. The
statements of individual commissioners have meaning only when such
positions coalesce into a formal decision of the Commission, acting by
majority vote, based upon the factual findings made and stated. And,
that decision, at best is only whether to recommend approval or denial of
the subdivision to the County Council. Changes or modifications of the
subdivision may be suggested or altered to gain their favorable
recommendation. The Commission role can only be to recommend
requirements to the Council as a part of their overall recommendation.

b.

Second, the Council finds, that the eventual recommendation for denial
of this subdivision should not have been a surprise to the owner. The
Council finds that the individual comments of many of the
commissioners were uniformly negative from the beginning. At several
meetings, a number of the commissioners publicly advised the owner
that they were unalterably opposed to locating this urban subdivision
within the County's Agricultural Zone and that such urban subdivisions
properly belonged within a city not in the unincorporated county. These

statements of the commissioners were entirely consistent with the
policies and recommendations of the Countywide Comprehensive Plan,
Zoning Ordinance and Subdivision Ordinance.
Third, the process of first filing a preliminary plat is designed to
discover, test and resolve any major issues prior to incurring sunk costs.
The Council cannot assume responsibility for sunk costs even prior to its
first consideration of a proposed preliminary plat. Apparently, this
owner purchased agricultural land assuming that a proposed subdivision
on his terms could not legally be denied. Unwise assumptions cannot
compel poor planning. For example, Mr. McFadden has insisted on
trying to shortcut the preliminary process by demanding, in a single
meeting, both preliminary and final approval from the Planning
Commission. Of course, the Planning Commission has no power to
grant either, their power being limited to making recommendations to
this body. Mr. McFadden has proceeded at his own risk without any
assurances of approval, entirely ignoring the preliminary plat process.
Fourth, the Council finds that Mr. McFadden has been advised
repeatedly by development staff of the potential problems with the
subdivision; that its development within the agricultural zone is
problematic. Specifically, he was advised by Mr. Teuscher that it was
contrary to the Countywide Comprehensive Plan and its concepts. Mr.
Tuescher repeatedly voiced the opinion to Mr. McFadden that the
subdivision would have substantial difficulties obtaining a favorable
recommendation from the Planning Commission and/or an approval
from the Council. Other staff members voiced similar opinions.
Fifth, the Council finds that this subdivision proposal is unique; nothing
similar has previously been approved in the unincorporated areas of
Cache County. Since this would represent a substantial departure from
existing practice and history there is little basis on which to justify
reliance. The Council notes that an urban subdivision, Cachemead, was
proposed in the early 1980s for the unincorporated areas above
Providence and Millville. That subdivision proposal was also denied.
Sixth, the Council finds that Mr. McFadden represented himself as an
experienced subdivider and developer. Any claimed lack of
understanding is an insufficient basis for reliance, given the involved
and lively presence of competent legal counsel.
Seventh, a reliance claim cannot lie in derogation of the clear written
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policies and standards long since adopted, published and continuously
sustained in the Countywide Comprehensive Plan, Zoning Ordinance
and Subdivision Ordinance.
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The Cache County Council directs that the foregoing Findings shall constitute
the written Findings for its Resolution of December 7th, 2004, denying the request for
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preliminary plat approval of the RAMAC-Foothills, LLC subdivision. These Findings
shall b e appended to t h e minutes of the Council meeting o f D e c e m b e r 7 t h , 2 0 0 4 .
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D A T E D this 14 th d a y o f D e c e m b e r , 2 0 0 4 .
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